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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature Of The Case 
 
 The state appeals from the district court’s order reducing felony battery on 
a law enforcement officer charges to misdemeanors and remanding them to the 
magistrate division. 
 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
 
 In an encounter with police, Cesar Gabriel Castrejon head-butted Gooding 
police officer Christopher Knott and repeatedly kicked the knee of Gooding 
County deputy sheriff Sabrina Becker.  (P.H. Tr., p. 4, L. 13 – p. 12, L. 18; p. 15, 
L. 5 – p. 20, L. 8.)  The state charged Castrejon with two felony counts of battery 
on a law enforcement officer.  (R., pp. 24-25.)  Count One charged that Castrejon 
“did actually, intentionally, and unlawfully, touch and/or strike the person of 
Officer Chris Knott, against his will by striking him in the face.”  (R., p. 25.)  Count 
Two charged that Castrejon “did actually, intentionally, and unlawfully, touch 
and/or strike the person of Deputy Sabrina Becker against her will by kicking her 
multiple times in her knee.”  (R., p. 25.) 
 Castrejon and the state entered a plea agreement whereby Castrejon 
would plead guilty to Count One of the information.  (R., pp. 37-40.)  At the 
change of plea hearing the district court, on its own initiative, questioned whether 
the language in the information was sufficient to charge a felony, as opposed to a 
misdemeanor.  (01/17/17 Tr., p. 3, Ls. 7-21.)  The prosecutor represented that 
the inclusion of the misdemeanor language was in the nature of a “clerical error” 
that he had intended to address before trial, and that he had called defense 
2 
 
counsel’s attention to it in the plea negotiations.  (01/17/17 Tr., p. 3, L. 22 – p. 4, 
L. 9.)  Castrejon’s counsel represented that he was aware that “unlawful touching 
is a misdemeanor,” but that the defense concluded that the “and/or made it quite 
fine” and elected to proceed with the plea agreement because the “Appellate 
Court would probably say it was sufficient” even though there is “misdemeanor 
language in it.”  (01/17/17 Tr., p. 4, Ls. 11-23.)  The district court, however, 
concluded that both touching and striking were misdemeanors, and therefore the 
court lacked “jurisdiction over a felony offense.”  (01/17/17 Tr., p. 7, L. 19 – p. 8, 
L. 2.)  Therefore, the district court ordered the case remanded to the magistrate 
division.  (01/17/17 Tr., p. 8, Ls. 2-3; R., p. 42.)   
The state filed a notice of appeal timely from the order of remand.  (R., 
pp. 44-46.) 
3 
 
ISSUE 
 
 Did the district court erroneously conclude the information charged only 
misdemeanors? 
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ARGUMENT 
 
The District Court Erred Because The Information Charged Felonies For Striking 
A Police Officer 
 
A. Introduction 
 
 The district court held: 
Given the way that Counts I and II are charged as unlawful 
touching and/or striking, I find that that is the language that is 
excepted out in subsection (3) of 18-915, so I do not believe that 
the Court has jurisdiction over a felony offense, so I’m going to 
remand this matter back to magistrate court for further proceedings. 
 
(01/17/17 Tr., p. 7, L. 22 – p. 8, L. 3.)  The flaw in the district court’s reasoning is 
that, although battery on a law enforcement officer by “touching” is a 
misdemeanor, battery on a law enforcement officer by “striking” is a felony.  The 
information therefore charged both a felony and a misdemeanor,1 and the district 
court erred by ordering the case remanded to the magistrate division. 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
 The interpretation and construction of a statute present questions of law 
over which the appellate court exercises free review.  State v. Thompson, 
140 Idaho 796, 798, 102 P.3d 1115, 1117 (2004); State v. Dorn, 140 Idaho 404, 
405, 94 P.3d 709, 710 (Ct. App. 2004). 
 
                                            
1 The prosecutor argued the misdemeanor “touching” was an included offense of 
the felony “striking.”  (01/17/17 Tr., p. 5, Ls. 11-23.) 
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C. The Plain Language Of The Statute Provides That Striking A Police Officer 
Is A Felony 
 
“When interpreting statutes we begin with the literal words of the statute, 
which are the best guide to determining legislative intent.”  Leavitt v. Craven, 
154 Idaho 661, 667, 302 P.3d 1, 7 (2012) (internal quotes, brackets and citation 
omitted).  If the plain language of the statute is unambiguous, “legislative history 
and other extrinsic evidence should not be consulted for the purpose of altering 
the clearly expressed intent of the legislature.”  Verska v. Saint Alphonsus 
Regional Medical Center, 151 Idaho 889, 893, 265 P.3d 502, 506 (2011).  
Review of the plain language of I.C. §§ 18-915(3) and 18-903 shows that striking 
an officer is a felony. 
 Under the plain language of the applicable statute, there are five actions 
that can constitute battery (force, violence, touching, striking, or causing bodily 
harm), all separated by the disjunctive “or”: 
Battery defined. A battery is any: 
 
(a)  Willful and unlawful use of force or violence upon the person of 
another; or 
 
(b)  Actual, intentional and unlawful touching or striking of another 
person against the will of the other; or 
 
(c)  Unlawfully and intentionally causing bodily harm to an 
individual. 
 
I.C. § 18-903 (italics and underlining added).2  Any battery under this definition, 
“except unlawful touching as described in section 18-903(b), Idaho Code,” 
                                            
2 A violation of I.C. § 18-903 alone is a misdemeanor punishable by up to six 
months in jail and a fine of up to $1000.  I.C. § 18-904.  Because the victims in 
this case were police officers, punishment would be doubled.  I.C. § 18-915(1)(b).  
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committed on a peace officer under certain conditions is a felony.  I.C. § 18-
915(3).  Because all five acts that constitute battery are set forth with the 
disjunctive “or,” and because only “touching” is excluded from the felony battery 
on a peace officer statute, using force, using violence, striking, or causing bodily 
harm are all batteries that qualify as felonies under I.C. § 18-915(3). 
 The information charged Castrejon with battery by both touching “and/or” 
striking the officer victims.  (R., p. 25.)  As set forth above, committing a battery 
on a law enforcement officer by “touching” him or her is not a felony under 
I.C. § 18-915(3), but committing a battery by “striking” an officer is such a felony.  
Because Castrejon was charged with striking the victim officers, he was charged 
with a felony.   
 The district court concluded that both touching and striking were excluded 
from the felony provisions of I.C. § 18-915(3).  (01/17/17 Tr., p. 7, L. 22 – p. 8, 
L. 2.)  The statute, however, exempts only “unlawful touching as described in 
section 18-903(b)” and does not exempt any other manner of committing a 
battery, including striking.  I.C. § 18-915(3).  Because the plain language of the 
statute exempts only touching, but does not exempt force, violence, striking or 
causing bodily harm, the district court misread and misapplied the statute.   
 The state charged felonies when it charged Castrejon with striking two 
police officers.  The district court’s conclusion that striking a police officer is not a 
felony, but only a misdemeanor, is contrary to the plain language of the 
applicable statute and therefore error.  The district court committed reversible 
error in its order remanding the charges to the magistrate division. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 The state respectfully requests this Court to reverse the district court’s 
order remanding the case to the magistrate division and remand for entry of the 
plea or other proceedings. 
 DATED this 14th day of June, 2017. 
 
      __/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen_________ 
      KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
      Deputy Attorney General 
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